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Untangling Tinker and Defining the Scope
of the Heckler’s Veto Doctrine’s
Protection of Students’ Free Speech Rights
Tryphena Liu
In the last thirty years, courts have steadily chipped away at the
protections afforded student free speech on K-12 campuses by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District. In Tinker, the Court held that schools
may not restrict students’ right to speak unless the speech causes, or
threatens to cause, a substantial disruption or infringes on the rights of
other students. This Note argues that the diminishing force of Tinker’s
protection of student free speech is largely the result of the difficulty of
applying Tinker’s ostensibly straightforward holding, and of
establishing the appropriate balance between maintaining a safe and
effective learning environment and protecting students’ First Amendment
rights. This Note proposes revisiting the heckler’s veto doctrine, which
prohibits the government from restricting speech solely based on the
disruptive or violent reaction of the listeners or onlookers (i.e., hecklers),
as a way to push back against the increasing encroachment on students’
First Amendment rights. Although the Court articulated the principles
of the heckler’s veto doctrine in Tinker, subsequent courts have failed to
clearly identify the implications of the doctrine on the Tinker analysis,
thus further weakening Tinker’s protection of student free speech. This
Note argues that future courts deciding student free speech questions
must explicitly address the heckler’s veto doctrine to prevent hecklers
from contributing to the infringement on students’ constitutional right to
both speak and hear. The Note concludes by suggesting a possible
solution that aims to adequately balance competing student rights.

Tryphena Liu is a junior associate at Lenze Lawyers, PLC in Manhattan Beach, California. She received
a bachelor’s degree in English literature from Scripps College and a juris doctor from the University of
California, Irvine School of Law. Her current area of practice is civil litigation, specifically mass tort
pharmaceutical drug and device defect, medical malpractice, and employment discrimination litigation.
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INTRODUCTION
The evolution of the doctrine espoused in the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, decided in 1969, has
weakened students’ free speech rights on K-12 campuses. One manifestation of this
evolution is increasing disregard for the heckler’s veto doctrine. A heckler’s veto
occurs when the government restricts speech solely based on the disruptive or
violent reaction of the listeners or onlookers.1 The heckler’s veto doctrine holds
that such action is unconstitutional.2 Despite the many court decisions upholding
bans on student expression that have led to the conclusion that Tinker is a principle
with no bite, courts have long relied on Tinker for the notion that students do not
“shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.”3 The majority in Tinker was concerned about preventing stateoperated schools from becoming “enclaves of totalitarianism,” where students may
only express state-sanctioned ideas.4 The Court noted that the protection of
constitutional rights in schools is especially important because schools are where
the nation’s young citizens learn the values of democracy.5 The Court relied on
Justice Brennan’s articulation of this principle in Keyishian v. Board of Regents of
University of State of New York:
“The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital
than in the community of American schools.” The classroom is peculiarly

1. See Nicole A. Maruzzi, Case Comment, Constitutional Law – First Amendment Gives Way to
a Heckler’s Veto – Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified School District, 767 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2014), 48
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 991, 993–94 (2015).
2. See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 5 (1949); Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform,
Inc. v. L.A. Cty. Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 787–88 (9th Cir. 2008).
3. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
4. Id. at 511.
5. See id. at 507.
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the “marketplace of ideas.” The Nation’s future depends upon leaders
trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which
discovers truth “out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any
kind of authoritative selection.”6
Nevertheless, the Court also acknowledged the deference given to school
officials to control conduct in schools.7 In order to balance these two interests, the
Court held that where students’ First Amendment freedom of expression rights are
at stake, the school “must be able to show that its action [to restrict student speech]
was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”8 Instead, the
school must demonstrate that school officials had reason to anticipate that the
banned speech would “substantially interfere with the work of the school or
impinge upon the rights of other students.”9
Applying these principles to the facts of Tinker, the Court found there was no
reasonable basis to support the school officials’ prediction that the wearing of black
armbands to protest the hostilities in Vietnam would cause substantial disruption
or a material interference with school activity.10 Additionally, the school failed to
demonstrate that the wearing of the armbands actually disrupted the work of the
school or any class because there were no threats or acts of violence on school
premises—only a few students had made hostile remarks to the students wearing
armbands.11 The Court thus concluded that the prohibition of the wearing of the
armbands to school violated students’ First Amendment rights.12
Scholars have noted that since the Supreme Court decided Tinker, lower courts
and the Supreme Court itself have problematically retreated from the opinion’s
original protections.13 Indeed, Tinker’s ostensibly easy conclusion is undercut by
subsequent applications of the “substantial disruption” test and the second prong
of the Tinker test: whether the challenged speech “impinge[s] upon the rights of
other students.”14 For example, in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, decided in
1986, the Supreme Court found that schools may proscribe speech that is “vulgar
and lewd” or “plainly offensive” without a showing of a threat of substantial
disruption.15 In balancing the free speech rights of students and the discretion of
school officials to control conduct in school, the Court weighed more in favor of
6. Id. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
7. See id. at 507.
8. Id. at 509.
9. Id.
10. See id. at 514.
11. See id. at 508.
12. See id.
13. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the Schoolhouse
Gates: What’s Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 528 (2000); Lucinda Housley Luetkemeyer,
Silencing the Rebel Yell: The Eighth Circuit Upholds a Public School’s Ban on Confederate Flags, 75
MO. L. REV. 989, 995 (2010).
14. Tinker, 337 U.S. at 509.
15. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683–85 (1986).
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the latter, emphasizing the importance of preserving the school’s basic educational
mission of advancing “the appropriate form of civil discourse and political
expression.”16 Even in lower court decisions that focused on the safety of the
students, courts expanded Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test to say that
restriction of free speech may be permissible even when the mode of expression at
issue has never caused or contributed to any prior disruptions.17
Another factor that has contributed to the diminishing protection of students’
free speech rights is an issue with the Tinker decision itself. Although the Supreme
Court articulated the principles of the heckler’s veto doctrine in Tinker, it did not
have an opportunity to address how the doctrine would apply in practice.
Specifically, the Court failed to consider the implications of the “substantial
disruption” test on the concerns the heckler’s veto doctrine sought to combat. In
effect, the “substantial disruption” test and the heckler’s veto doctrine are
inconsistent with each other. In addition, because the Court likely came to its
findings in Tinker based on the assumption that the school was the only silencing
agent, it inadvertently created a road map for ways in which other students could
bypass the heckler’s veto doctrine and silence the speaker. For example, under the
“substantial disruption” test, students can cause the school to silence the speaker
merely by threatening substantial disruption.
Students’ right to speak is enshrined in but also limited by doctrine. Students
have the right to speak unrestricted by the school if the speech does not cause, or
threaten to cause, a substantial disruption, or infringe on the rights of other
students.18 However, this basic formulation of the Tinker test, which was perhaps
once clear, has now become muddled as courts grapple with finding the proper
balance between preserving schools as the marketplace of ideas and ensuring
schools are able to advance their educational goals, which include both protecting
students and maintaining classroom decorum. More often than not, courts decide
to silence speakers, finding that the latter interest outweighs students’ free speech
rights.19 Furthermore, sophisticated opponents of speakers recognize that they can
turn these tests to their advantage, a move that implicates the heckler’s veto
doctrine.
Part I of this Note discusses three different frameworks courts have used to
analyze restrictions on student free speech under Tinker: (A) Tinker’s “substantial
disruption” test, (B) Fraser’s “plainly offensive” standard, and (C) the heckler’s veto
doctrine. Part I demonstrates how the “substantial disruption” test and the plainly
offensive standard, developed from Tinker’s “rights of other students” prong, fail
to adequately protect speakers from being silenced by hecklers. Part I also points
out that even decisions that have applied the heckler’s veto doctrine do not provide
16. Id.
17. See B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 734, 739 (8th Cir. 2009); Luetkemeyer,
supra note 13, at 1002.
18. Tinker, 337 U.S. at 509.
19. See Luetkemeyer, supra note 13, at 1002.
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clear guidance on how schools can distinguish between hecklers who merely
disagree with the speaker’s message and genuinely aggrieved listeners who are
reasonably offended or harmed by the speech. Part II illustrates how lower courts’
application of the two prongs of the Tinker test—the “rights of other students”
prong and the “substantial disruption” prong—chip away at the protections
afforded by the heckler’s veto doctrine. Lastly, Part III argues that schools and
courts are not appropriately balancing the rights of students because they not only
privilege the rights of potential hecklers over those of speakers, but they also fail to
take into account the constitutionally-protected right of students who are not
opposed to the contested expression to hear the speaker. Part III concludes that it
is especially important for analyses of students’ free speech rights on campus to
explicitly address the heckler’s veto doctrine in order to prevent hecklers from
infringing on the rights of students to both speak and hear.
I. COMPLICATIONS WITH APPLICATION OF TINKER
Student free speech rights decisions issued after Tinker use the “substantial
disruption” prong and the “rights of other students” prong of the Tinker test to
create exceptions to the free speech guarantees of Tinker. These exceptions
undermine the heckler’s veto doctrine and make it easier for schools to silence
students. Specifically, applications of Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test fail to
consider the possibility that students may be tactically threatening or engaging in
substantial disruption just to silence the speaker. As a result, the “substantial
disruption” exception creates the possibility of schools silencing speakers based on
the reactions of hecklers anytime the school can establish a threat of substantial
disruption. Fraser’s “plainly offensive” standard also facilitates schools’ ability to
silence speakers by allowing schools and courts to impose their own judgment about
the effects of speech on students to justify a ban on the speech. This Part concludes
by noting that the protections supposedly afforded by the heckler’s veto doctrine
do little to combat the effect of these exceptions. Not only are applications of the
heckler’s veto doctrine inconsistent with each other, but they also leave many
questions unanswered.
A. Tinker’s “Substantial Disruption” Test
Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test is inherently in tension with the heckler’s
veto doctrine because it allows schools to silence speakers based on the actual or
feared reaction of other students if the reaction rises to the level of substantial
disruption. This tension is evident in appellate courts’ application of the “substantial
disruption” test to cases deciding the constitutionality of prohibitions of the display
of the Confederate flag.20 The majority of these cases have found that a history of

20. See Hardwick ex rel. Hardwick v. Heyward, 711 F.3d 426, 432 (4th Cir. 2013); Defoe ex
rel. Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324, 334 (6th Cir. 2010); B.W.A., 554 F.3d at 740–41; Barr v. Lafon, 538
F.3d 554, 567 (6th Cir. 2008); West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1366 (10th
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racial tension made the school’s prediction of substantial disruption reasonable.21
The Eighth Circuit reasoned, “Racial tension can devolve to violence suddenly.
Schools may act proactively to prohibit race-related violence or even excessive racial
tension that forces unnecessary departures of minority students from the school.”22
Similarly, in Defoe v. Spiva, the Sixth Circuit concluded that even if the display of the
Confederate flag does not actually disrupt the learning environment, a school could
still reasonably forecast that displays of the flag would likely contribute to disruption
in the future due to the “incendiary atmosphere then existing.”23 Based on the facts
of Defoe, the court found it was not unconstitutional for the school to prohibit
students from wearing T-shirts displaying the Confederate flag to campus because
the “racial violence, tension, and threats occurring in Anderson County schools as
well as the fact that the Confederate flag is a ‘controversial racial and political
symbol’” supported the school officials’ conclusion that displays of the Confederate
flag would result in substantial disruption of the school environment.24
These cases indicate that a school may ban certain student expression as long
as the school officials can point to instances in which the mode of expression at
issue has caused disruptions in the past. This seemingly straightforward analysis
becomes complicated when determining whether the seriousness or the number of
past disruptions matters. It also raises the question of whether these courts were
easily able to find bans on the display of the Confederate flag constitutional because
the Confederate flag is an unquestionably divisive symbol. For example, it is less
clear whether a case concerning a ban on the display of the American flag in a
specific context would be as readily held constitutional, especially when the display
does not cause a substantial disruption.25 More importantly, this analysis does not
account for the heckler’s veto problem. Because there is no disagreement that the
Confederate flag is a controversial symbol, the schools and the courts did not have
to consider the possibility that students were tactically attempting to silence the
speaker. Thus, cases dealing with incontestably controversial symbols do not fully
address the tension between Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test and the heckler’s
veto doctrine, and consequently fail to provide any guidance on how to assess
whether a disruption in response to a student’s expression is tactical or genuine.
B. Fraser’s “Plainly Offensive” Standard
As mentioned, the Supreme Court carved out an exception to Tinker’s
“substantial disruption” test by finding prohibitions of “plainly offensive”

Cir. 2000); Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332, 1335 (6th Cir. 1972); Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594, 598
(6th Cir. 1970).
21. Supra note 20.
22. B.W.A., 554 F.3d at 741.
23. Defoe, 625 F.3d at 335 (quoting D.B. ex rel. Brogdon v. Lafon, 217 F. App’x 518, 523 (6th
Cir. 2007)).
24. Id. at 336 (quoting Castorina v. Madison Cty. Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536, 542 (6th Cir. 2001)).
25. See Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764, 779 (9th Cir. 2014).
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expression, such as lewd and vulgar speech, constitutional in Fraser.26 In so finding,
the Court underscored the context of the school, where the sensibility of minors is
at stake: “the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.”27 The Court noted, “This
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence has acknowledged limitations on the
otherwise absolute interest of the speaker in reaching an unlimited audience where
the speech is sexually explicit and the audience may include children.”28 The Court
focused on the need to prevent minors from both being exposed to and
perpetuating speech that conflicts with the standards of decency of a democratic
society.29 The Court stated that “schools must teach by example the shared values
of a civilized social order.”30 Consequently, in Fraser, the Court found it permissible
for the school to restrict a student’s free speech rights where, during a speech
nominating a classmate for student office, the student referred to his candidate in
terms of an “elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.”31 The Court
indicated that unlike the passive expression of a political viewpoint in Tinker, the
sexual content of the speech in the present case intruded upon the work of the
school and the rights of the other students.32 Specifically, the Court stated that “[b]y
glorifying male sexuality, and in its verbal content, the speech was acutely insulting
to teenage girl students.”33
In Nixon v. Local School District Board of Education, an Ohio district court
interpreted Fraser’s holding to mean that the “plainly offensive” standard only
applies to speech that is offensive “because of the manner in which it is conveyed.”34
The court stated that some examples of such expression include speech containing
“vulgar language, graphic sexual innuendos, or speech that promotes suicide, drugs,
alcohol, or murder.”35 The court distinguished this expression from speech that
conveys a potentially offensive political viewpoint.36 In Nixon, a student wore a
T-shirt to school that contained the following statements: “Homosexuality is a
sin! Islam is a lie! Abortion is murder!”37 Having established the distinction between
the types of speech regulated by Fraser and those by Tinker, the court concluded,
“Clearly, [the student’s] shirt is not plainly offensive based on the manner in which
its message is conveyed. Rather, any offensive characteristics of [the student’s] shirt
stem from the views espoused thereon, thus rendering it necessary to analyze this

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683–85 (1986).
Id. at 682.
Id.
See id. at 681–84.
Id. at 683.
Id. at 678.
Id. at 680.
Id. at 683.
Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 971 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
Id.
See id.
Id. at 967.
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case under Tinker.”38 The court then applied Tinker’s substantial disruption test.
However, as discussed more in Part II, this attempt to distinguish between
“plainly offensive” speech and speech that conveys a potentially offensive political
viewpoint is largely futile, especially because the Ninth Circuit has opened the door
to upholding restrictions on speech where “the views espoused thereon” are
directed at students of a certain minority status.39 Therefore, Fraser not only
undercuts Tinker’s protection of students’ free speech rights, but it also pulls Tinker
even further away from the heckler’s veto doctrine by lowering the bar for both the
school and the student to silence the speaker.
C. The Heckler’s Veto Doctrine
In theory, the heckler’s veto doctrine places limits on schools’ discretion in
determining what types of speech are proscribable. The Supreme Court articulated
this doctrine in its decision in Terminiello v. City of Chicago, where it reversed a
conviction that was based on a city ordinance prohibiting speech which “stir[red]
the public to anger, invite[d] dispute, [brought] about a condition of unrest, or
create[d] a disturbance.”40 The Court stated that none of these grounds may be the
basis for a conviction.41 The Court further explained this holding in its opinion in
Street v. New York, where it found it unconstitutional to criminally convict an
individual for standing across the street from a burning American flag and stating
to a crowd of people: “We don’t need no damn flag.”42 The Court reasoned that
such a conviction could not be justified by “the possible tendency of appellant’s
words to provoke violent retaliation”43 or sustained on the ground that “appellant’s
words were likely to shock passers-by.”44 It explained that “any shock effect of
appellant’s speech must be attributed to the content of the ideas expressed”45 and
that “[i]t is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas
may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some
of their hearers.”46 The Court therefore concluded that the speaker could not be
silenced based on the effect of his words on listeners, demonstrating a great concern
for protecting the right to freedom of expression. However, the Court has noted an
exception to the heckler’s veto doctrine for “fighting words.” In Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, the Court stated:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane,
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
See Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006).
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 3 (1949).
See id. at 5.
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 590–91 (1969).
Id. at 592.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words – those which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace.47
This exception makes the heckler’s veto doctrine a challenge to apply because
it is difficult to distinguish between “fighting words” that “by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace”48 and speech that
merely “stirs the public to anger” or “creates a disturbance.”49
If it is difficult to determine when the heckler’s veto doctrine applies in First
Amendment cases in general, its invocation in school settings is likely arbitrary,
especially with the added consideration of the protection of minors from harmful
speech.50 At first glance, Tinker appears to be a paradigmatic articulation of the
doctrine. This is evidenced by the fact that in Tinker, the Supreme Court cites to its
decision in Terminiello for the notion that the right to freedom of expression must
be protected despite the risk of disturbance, stating:
[ I ]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is
not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any departure
from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from the
majority’s opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the
lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another
person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution
says we must take this risk . . . .51
Consequently, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have interpreted Tinker as
an application of the doctrine to free speech regulation in schools.52 These courts
have relied on the doctrine to say that unless the speaker’s speech constitutes
“fighting words,” it is impermissible to use threats of violence or disruption by
hecklers to silence a speaker.53 The Seventh Circuit stated:
Statements that while not fighting words are met by violence or threats or
other unprivileged retaliatory conduct by persons offended by them cannot
lawfully be suppressed because of that conduct. Otherwise free speech
could be stifled by the speaker’s opponent’s mounting a riot, even though,
because the speech had contained no fighting words, no reasonable person
would have been moved to a riotous response.54
Applying this principle in Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie School District, the Seventh
Circuit found that a school unconstitutionally restricted students’ free speech when
it banned the display of the slogan, “Be Happy, Not Gay,” as a violation of a school

47. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
48. Id. at 572.
49. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 3 (1949).
50. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
51. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969).
52. See Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 636 F.3d 874, 879 (7th Cir. 2011);
Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1275 (11th Cir. 2004).
53. See Zamecnik, 636 F.3d at 879; Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1275–76.
54. Zamecnik, 636 F.3d at 879.
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rule forbidding “‘derogatory comments’ spoken or written, ‘that refer to race,
ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or disability.’”55 The court stated that
because “Be Happy, Not Gay” did not constitute fighting words, the school could
not ban the speech based on the fact that other students had harassed the speaker
because of their disapproval of her message.56 The court explained that such a ban
would violate the heckler’s veto doctrine.57
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit alluded to the heckler’s veto doctrine in its
decision in Holloman v. Harland, stating, “While the same constitutional standards
do not always apply in public schools as on public streets, we cannot afford students
less constitutional protection simply because their peers might illegally express
disagreement through violence instead of reason.”58 However, the court also added
the caveat that the protection only applies if the speech is not “so inherently
inflammatory as to come within that small class of ‘fighting words’ which are ‘likely
to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the
peace.’”59 In Holloman, a school punished a student for refusing to recite the Pledge
of Allegiance and silently raising his fist in the air during the class recitation of the
pledge.60 The court found the school’s restriction of the student’s free speech
unconstitutional because the student’s expression “was not directed ‘toward’ anyone
or any group and could not be construed by a reasonable person . . . as a personal
offense or insult.”61 In other words, the student’s speech did not constitute fighting
words.
Interestingly, the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of the fighting words
exception is actually consistent with the heckler’s veto doctrine. In Holloman, the
court equates the use of fighting words with substantial disruption, focusing on the
actions of the speaker rather than the response of the listeners. It concluded:
Even if [the school was] correct in fearing that other students may react
inappropriately or illegally, such reactions do not justify suppression of [the
student’s] expression . . . because the record reveals no way in which he
“materially and substantially interfere[d] with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.”62
Thus, if the speaker’s expression of fighting words does not cause a substantial
disruption, then the school may not silence the speaker, regardless of whether the
school reasonably predicted a threat of substantial disruption by listeners. Because
the school can only ban speech based on the actions of the speaker under this
principle, there is no risk of violating the heckler’s veto doctrine. This suggests that

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 875.
See id. at 879.
See id.
Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1276.
Id. (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)).
See id. at 1261.
Id. at 1275.
Id. at 1276 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
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one way to determine whether the substantial disruption is tactical or genuine is by
looking at the conduct of the speaker. If the speaker uses fighting words, then the
school may assume that the protesting listeners are not hecklers because such words
“by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace.”63 However, the court provides little guidance on how to determine when
speech constitutes fighting words. On one end of the spectrum is raising a fist
during the Pledge of Allegiance, on the other end is doing a Nazi salute, but what if
the student had raised a middle finger during the pledge? In addition, as will be
discussed more in Part II, courts have looked at whether the speech is targeted,
denigrating members of specific groups, as a way to assess whether speech may be
limited. However, this leads to Kellam Conover’s question in his article, Protecting
the Children: When Can Schools Restrict Harmful Student Speech?: “Does the speech
have to be individually targeted, or are broad political statements also
proscribable?”64 As mentioned previously, in Nixon, the district court deemed
speech conveying an offensive political viewpoint innocuous, but it is not hard to
imagine situations in which such speech could be nonetheless considered inherently
inflammatory. For instance, does a history of racial tension make an offensive
political viewpoint inherently inflammatory?
To add further to these complications, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in
Zamecnik indicates that, contrary to the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of the
“substantial disruption” test, there are certain circumstances in which the school
may silence the speaker if the hostility incited by the speech threatens or causes
substantial disruption, regardless of whether the speaker used fighting words.65
Indeed, the court acknowledged that although Tinker endorsed the heckler’s veto
doctrine, Tinker is “also the source of the ‘substantial disruption’ test of permissible
school censorship.”66 Ultimately, the court concluded that the anger incited by the
student’s display of the words “Be Happy, Not Gay” did not rise to the level of
substantial disruption, and therefore, the school could not constitutionally proscribe
such speech.67 Nevertheless, because the Seventh Circuit has indicated that there
are situations in which the “substantial disruption” test can trump the heckler’s veto
doctrine, even if the speech does not fall under the fighting words exception, the
protections ostensibly guaranteed by the heckler’s veto doctrine are tenuous. In
addition, several questions are left unanswered. For example, how do we distinguish
between speech that is proscribable because it is “inherently inflammatory and not
inherently provocative speech that schools cannot ban even though the speech may
elicit a violent response from other students? When does a response become
sufficiently disruptive to justify a ban on the speech?

63.
64.

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
Kellam Conover, Protecting the Children: When Can Schools Restrict Harmful Student Speech?,
26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 349, 351 (2015).
65. See Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 636 F.3d 874, 879 (7th Cir. 2011).
66. Id.
67. See id. at 880.
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II. A CASE STUDY OF THE DIFFERENT BRANCHES OF THE TINKER ANALYSIS
On top of the already tenuous foundation of the heckler’s veto doctrine,
subsequent applications of the Tinker analysis continue to undermine the
protections of speech afforded by the doctrine. In fact, both prongs of the Tinker
test, the “rights of other students” prong and the “substantial disruption” prong,
provide an avenue for schools and courts to sidestep the doctrine. Specifically, the
rights of others prong presents courts the opportunity to uphold prohibitions of
speech based on their own judgment about what constitutes sufficiently offensive
speech. At the same time, the “substantial disruption” prong allows hecklers to use
the threat of substantial disruption to silence speech that would otherwise be
protected.
A. Tinker Test Prong One: Rights of Other Students
Like Fraser’s plainly offensive standard and the Eleventh Circuit’s fighting
words exception, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Harper v. Poway Unified School
District avoids running into the heckler’s veto doctrine by determining that listeners
are not merely hecklers if they are genuinely aggrieved by the challenged speech.68
Consistent with the fighting words exception, which excludes offensive speech
“directed ‘toward’ anyone or any group”69 from First Amendment protection, the
court focused on the identity of the listeners and whether the speech singles out for
denigration a particular, vulnerable group (regardless of whether the group is in the
audience). This is problematic because the Ninth Circuit expands the definition of
“plainly offensive” or “inherently inflammatory” speech using the “rights of other
students” prong of the Tinker test. In Harper, a student wore a T-shirt to school
reading “I WILL NOT ACCEPT WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED.” on the
front, and “HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL.” on the back.70 Focusing on
the “rights of other students” analysis, the court found it permissible for schools to
ban such speech, because speech targeted at students who are members of minority
groups that have historically been oppressed “serves to injure and intimidate them,
as well as to damage their sense of security and interfere with their opportunity to
learn.”71 Interestingly, the court adds the caveat that its holding is limited to
“instances of derogatory and injurious remarks directed at students’ minority status
such as race, religion, and sexual orientation.”72 It grounds its reasoning in the
principles Tinker espoused, emphasizing, “Engaging in controversial political
speech, even when it is offensive to others, is an important right of all Americans
and learning the value of such freedoms is an essential part of a public school
education.”73 However, despite the court’s attempt to limit its holding, the court’s
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006).
Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1275 (11th Cir. 2004).
Harper, 445 F.3d at 1171.
Id. at 1178.
Id. at 1183.
Id. at 1182–83.
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rationale is similar to that of the Supreme Court in Fraser, where the Court expanded
the scope of proscribable speech by imposing its own judgment as to
what constitutes impermissibly offensive speech. In her article, In Defense of the
“Hazardous Freedom” of Controversial Student Speech, Abby Marie Mollen states that
this violates Tinker because “it indirectly gives schools the power to suppress the
expression of ideas they oppose by characterizing those ideas as harmful.”74 In fact,
the reasoning in Harper gives schools even broader discretion to decide when
student speech is proscribable because, in addition to speech deemed offensive by
societal standards, certain types of speech may be deemed offensive based on the
identity of the listener.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Harper conflicts with the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Zamecnik, where the court indicated that a school could only
justify a ban on speech if it presented empirical evidence of the harmful effects of
the speech on the particular minority targeted.75 Such an objective standard would
place limits on schools’ and courts’ ability to impose their own determination of
offensive speech. This objective test would also resolve the Eleventh Circuit’s
heckler’s veto doctrine concerns that students could silence a speaker by “[cloaking]
their disagreement in the guise of offense or disgust.”76 However, the Seventh
Circuit’s test fails to account for other identities that may not fit cleanly within a
minority category, thus potentially privileging the rights of certain students over
others. In his article, Post-Tinker, Raymond George Wright posits that Harper
demonstrates the potential for broadly expanding the “rights of others” prong of
the Tinker test,77 noting, “What is emotionally central to students’ identities may
vary broadly. And whether purely numerical minority status, locally or more broadly,
should entirely exhaust the logic of the court’s opinion in Harper is an unresolved
further issue.”78 These unanswered questions and the circuit split over how schools
can justify a ban on speech based on the minority status of the listeners provide
schools unclear guidance on how to balance the heckler’s veto doctrine, which
would require allowing potentially offensive speakers to speak, against the rights of
minority students who might find themselves the targets of the speaker’s derogatory
remarks.
B. Tinker Test Prong Two: Substantial Disruption
In yet another case upholding a restriction on students’ free speech, Dariano
v. Morgan Hill Unified School District, the Ninth Circuit relied on Tinker’s “substantial
disruption” prong to hold a school’s ban on wearing American flags to school

74. Abby Marie Mollen, In Defense of the “Hazardous Freedom” of Controversial Student Speech,
102 NW. U. L. REV. 1501, 1505 (2008).
75. See Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 636 F.3d 874, 881 (7th Cir. 2011).
76. Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1275 (11th Cir. 2004).
77. See Raymond George Wright, Post-Tinker, 10 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 1, 10
(2014).
78. Id. at 11.
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on Cinco de Mayo constitutional.79 The court found the facts of Dariano
distinguishable from those in Tinker, determining that there was significant
evidence of “nascent and escalating violence” at the school.80 Specifically, the
school officials’ prediction of violence was based on the context of ongoing racial
tension and gang violence at the school, in addition to an almost-violent dispute
over the display of an American flag during Cinco de Mayo the year before.81
Notably, the court acknowledged concerns about the heckler’s veto because the
school was restricting speech based on the reactions to the speech. However, the
court nonetheless declined to apply the doctrine and instead relied on Tinker’s
“substantial disruption” test: “Where speech ‘for any reason . . . materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder . . .’ school officials may limit the
speech.”82 It reasoned that it would be overly burdensome to require schools to
specifically identify the source of a violent threat before taking preemptive measures
to ensure the safety of students.83 In fact, because of the special context of the
school and the paramount interest in protecting a school’s learning environment
and its students, the court essentially concluded that the heckler’s veto doctrine does
not apply at all in the school context. It stated, “[T]he crucial distinction is the nature
of the speech, not the source of it,” indicating that schools may suppress speech
based on the reactions of hecklers.84 Thus, the Ninth Circuit has determined that
Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test overrides the heckler’s veto doctrine. Because
listeners can tactically plan violent or substantially disruptive protests in order to
silence a speaker under this principle, the triumph of Tinker’s “substantial
disruption” test effectively undermines any residual protection of students’ free
speech rights afforded by the heckler’s veto doctrine.
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Courts’ emphasis on Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test is understandable
because schools undoubtedly have a strong interest in protecting the safety of
students. “[B]ecause school attendance is compelled, students are not able to
remove themselves, or be as easily removed, from the situation,” and, therefore,
“the duty to protect [students] from harm is arguably heightened in this
environment.”85 Nevertheless, although schools may be uniquely vulnerable to
disruption by speakers’ speech, schools are also uniquely equipped to manage
different points of view in pursuit of the education of the future citizenry. The
following sections discuss the ideal solution to combating the diminishing

79. See Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764, 779 (9th Cir. 2014).
80. Id. at 776.
81. See id. at 777.
82. Id. at 778.
83. See id.
84. Id.
85. Case Note, Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified School District, 767 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2014),
Cert. Denied, 2015 WL 1400871, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2066, 2072 (2015).
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protections of Tinker, the factors that schools and courts should be careful to
consider in moving forward in order to adequately protect students’ free speech
rights, and the possibilities of one pragmatic solution.
A. The Ideal
In an ideal world, a solution to the problem of balancing students’ rights is to
require schools to hold a large assembly to talk through issues whenever there is a
dispute over a speaker’s expression. This would be in line with the Court’s assertion
in Tinker that as U.S. citizens, we must take the risk of disturbance in order to protect
the right to freedom of expression because “our history says that it is this sort of
hazardous freedom—this kind of openness—that is the basis of our national
strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in
this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.”86 In fact, this has been a
firmly held notion even before Tinker. In West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, where the Supreme Court found it an unconstitutional violation of First
Amendment rights to compel unwilling students to salute the American flag,87 the
Court stated, “[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much.
That would be a mere shadow of freedom.”88 Therefore, requiring an open forum
in school to allow students to express their different views and opinions and
respectfully respond to those of others would truly adhere to the principles
espoused in Tinker by upholding schools as the “market place of ideas,”
emphasizing the importance of open discussion, and protecting the free speech
rights of students to express different opinions and views, even when such views
may be controversial.
B. Balancing the Rights of Others
However, requiring a student assembly for every free speech dispute is likely
unrealistic considering time and cost constraints. In formulating a more pragmatic
solution, courts should take into account the fact that both the “substantial
disruption” prong and the rights of other students prong of the Tinker test fail to
consider the rights of a third group of students—third-party students who may, at
least initially, have no particular feelings about the speaker. The Supreme Court has
recognized the right to hear, or the “right to receive information and ideas,” as a
constitutional right.89 For example, in Thomas v. Collins, the Court held that a state
law requiring organizers to register before soliciting union membership was
unconstitutional because it impermissibly restricted not only a labor organizer’s
right to speak, but also the “rights of the workers to hear what he had to say.”90 The

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969).
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
Id.
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945).
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Supreme Court has even stated that the right to receive information and ideas is
“‘nowhere more vital’ than in our schools and universities.”91 In Sheck v. Baileyville
School Committee, the district court explained the importance of this right in schools,
stating, “The robust traditions of public education in our constitutional
jurisprudence contradict assertions that the Bill of Rights constrains the
abridgement of free expression for the exclusive benefit of the speaker.”92 Although
the court was deciding the constitutionality of a ban on a library book in Sheck, the
court nevertheless cited the Tinker principles to support the protection of students’
right to hear: “Public schools are major marketplaces of ideas, and First
Amendment rights must be accorded all ‘persons’ in the market for ideas.”93
Therefore, courts should be cautious of minimizing concerns about the heckler’s
veto, because by disregarding the doctrine, courts allow hecklers to abridge not only
the speaker’s free speech rights, but also third-party students’ right to hear.
The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of appropriately balancing
the rights of all three groups—the speaker, the protesting listeners, and the
bystanders—in Martin v. City of Struthers, where it decided the constitutionality of a
city ordinance prohibiting people from engaging in door-to-door distribution of
literature.94 The Court stated:
We are faced in the instant case with the necessity of weighing the
conflicting interests of the [speaker] in the civil rights she claims, as well as
the right of the individual householder to determine whether he is willing
to receive her message, against the interest of the community which by this
ordinance offers to protect the interests of all of its citizens, whether
particular citizens want that protection or not.95
The Court noted that it was particularly important that it carefully examine the
effect and purpose of the ordinance because the ordinance assumes the judgment
of the individual householder as the judgment of the community, and criminally
punishes a speaker for distributing literature to householders even if the recipients
may be welcome to receiving the literature.96 This consideration offers a way to
balance students’ rights in public schools. Thus far, there has not been enough
attention paid to the rights of third-party students, who, like the individual
householder discussed in Martin, may welcome the speaker’s speech, or at least be
open to hearing the speech. Courts have always given great deference to schools to
decide what speech students may hear.97 Therefore, schools, instead of hecklers,
should be the ones to make this decision. Because school officials should aspire to

91. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 763 (1972) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
487 (1960)).
92. Sheck v. Baileyville Sch. Comm., 530 F. Supp. 679, 686–87 (D. Me. 1982).
93. Id.
94. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 141–42 (1943).
95. Id. at 143.
96. See id. at 143–44.
97. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
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preserve the classroom as the “marketplace of ideas,”98 consistent with the Tinker
principles, such a decision should be made with the goal of protecting students’
right to speak and to hear.
C. The Pragmatic Solution
Although schools should strive for the ideal assembly solution, perhaps a more
pragmatic solution is to determine whether the protesting listeners are genuinely
aggrieved, as the Ninth Circuit has attempted to do by looking at the identity of the
“hecklers.”99 This is an important consideration because if courts uphold school
bans silencing the speaker without determining whether the substantial disruption
caused by the listeners is genuine or, instead, for the sole purpose of silencing the
speaker, they impermissibly value the free speech rights of the listeners over those
of the speaker. By being required to assess whether listeners are genuinely aggrieved
before imposing a ban on student expression, a school would only be able to silence
the speaker if it could cite to evidence demonstrating the harmful effects of the
speech on the listener based on the fact that the student belongs to a group that has
been historically oppressed. Adopting a reasonableness standard, like that implied
in Zamecnik,100 would enable schools to protect the rights of other students, or the
listeners, without improperly restricting the First Amendment rights of speakers and
third-party students. As for the “substantial disruption” prong, if a school could not
demonstrate that the listeners were genuinely aggrieved students, the school would
not be able to ban the speech unless it could cite to specific examples of how the
speech substantially interfered with the students’ ability to learn. Although this is
not a perfect solution, it is perhaps the solution schools must settle for in order to
properly preserve the Tinker principles.
CONCLUSION
Finding the right balance between ensuring schools are able to advance their
educational goals and protecting the First Amendment rights of students is
undoubtedly a great challenge. Tinker, the paragon of student free speech rights,
attempted to formulate a way to achieve an appropriate balance between these
interests. However, subsequent decisions have used both the “substantial
disruption” prong and the “rights of other students” prong of the Tinker test to
create exceptions that significantly diminish First Amendment protections for
students. Furthermore, because at the time the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Tinker, it did not have the opportunity to consider the possibility that hecklers could
be staging substantial disruption just to silence the speaker, the decision left speakers
vulnerable to attack. This note identifies the ideal solution to returning to the

98. Id. at 512.
99. See Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006).
100. See Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 636 F.3d 874, 879 (7th Cir. 2011).
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original principles of Tinker, but proposes a more pragmatic solution that takes into
account an aspect of the free speech analysis that has received little attention: the
rights of bystanders and how a decision to silence a speaker based on the demands
of potential hecklers must be carefully considered because of its effect on these
bystanders, who have a constitutional right to listen to speech. This Note argues
that in the context of K-12 public schools, school officials should be the ones to
decide what students can hear instead of allowing this determination to be made by
hecklers. In order to preserve schools as marketplaces of ideas, as championed by
Tinker, officials should aim to maximize First Amendment protections for students.
With this goal in mind, schools should focus on the identity of the potential hecklers
and use an objective test to determine whether the potential hecklers are actually
genuinely aggrieved listeners before the school decides to silence the speaker.

